Dated back to the opening up policy, Chinese economy had been rising tremendously, coupled with achievement, though housing challenges across the country greatly arose. Under the traditional planned economy since 1949, entirely housing construction became the State responsibility. As a result of lack of finances, new housing production has not emerged while nation population on rise. till 1988 when Urban housing reform existed as proposed strategy of affordable housing for the ordinary households through the private housing market. However, the strategy faced numerous obstacles such as lack of second hands market, an undeveloped real estate profession, indistinct land and property and property regulation plus absence of proper property management support. Amid these obstacles, the lack of housing finance would appeared to be a vital problem. Government Introduction of housing provident fund (HPF) scheme in 1991 applied as right measures for curving housing funding problems, under the Housing development fun, all employees required to contribute a percentage of their incomes to housing funding problems and employers contributed a similar amount. individual workers Accounts were opened with Construction Bank of China. Currently workers allowed to withdraw their housing development savings at retirement period, instead their application for their housing development savings as homes purchases in housing market. This has been implemented to the letter in most cities in China, regardless of variations of operational schemes and architectural demands in consideration to geological that varies from locality to another [1] . applying an experiential research of the housing development savings Scheme in Shanghai as a case research, this paper reviews the role of the HPF in financing affordable housing expansion in most parts of China.
Introduction
Housing reform has been a critical element of the overall economic reforms in urban China from the mid-1980s onward. Since 1949, China as a socialist country with own characteristic, has adopted a welfare housing system where the production However, construction activity is usually subject to more risk than other business activities because of its complexity particularly in coordinating a wide range of disparate and interrelated skills and activities. [2] Unlike a mere employer, the work unit provided almost all aspects of welfare including housing, medical care and education. This scenario has changed though excelled in the mid-1980s when housing reform was initiated in major Chinese cities. As early as the late 1970s, China decided to opt for economic reform by promoting market mechanisms within its socialist planned economy under rulership of Deng Xiaoping. The economic reform progressed well and gradually expanded to other non-production sectors avoiding the condiment in building industry.
By the mid-1980s, state enterprises/work units began to shed their welfare responsibilities and concentrate on production activities. A crucial part of this development was economic reform associated with the removal of housing provision as employment welfare.
The induvial salaries in the country continued to be low due to government and workers as results of heavy Appropriations and the social welfare to their employees. Wages in China remained very low because the government and work units provided heavy subsidies and social welfare to their employees. It is argued that although housing reform has brought significant changes to the housing provision system and improved many urban residents' living conditions, it has not entirely broken the traditional system. [3] . Economic reform obligatory subsidies and welfare could be gradually abolished. In 1998, Zhu Rongji, Premier of the Chinese State Council, proposed that the housing market would be a pioneer sector in the Chinese economy. Along with the reform of remuneration structures, people would be provided with better pay in exchange for taking care of their own housing needs. As shown in Table 1 , the annual actual income per capita in Shanghai increased throughout the 1990s by 500%. The highest income group experienced a 700% increase during the same period. The outcome of these reforms changed housing from a kind of social welfare to a private commodity [4] .
A series of housing reform policies aimed at transferring the accountability for housing provision from the State to the market have been proposed since 1988.
Numerous plans put in place solely owned by the state initiatives/work units to the occupants. Nevertheless, responses were not admirable as expected. Thus was because of a discrepancy between affordability to urban dwellers and the price level of the commodity housing. Counting, housing units were still being allocated to the workers by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which made housing reform extra difficult to achieve. After years of piecemeal urban housing reform, the Chinese Government adopted a general policy course for urban housing reform that required the transfer of responsibility for housing provision from the State to the market [5] . The main focus in the late 1990s was a shift to the operation level of providing financial assistance to the homebuyers. The principles associated with a Housing Provident Fund (HPF) Scheme previously adopted in Singapore, were considered by the Chinese Government and deemed to be applicable to China.
The HPF Scheme in Urban China
In early 1991, the Shanghai municipal government established its own HPF Scheme and subsequently introduced its housing reform policy in May, 1991.
There were five key policy measures under the housing reform program:
1) Implement the HPF Scheme;
2) Increase rents and replace by wage subsidies;
3) Those who were allocated housing were required to purchase housing bonds; 4) Tenants can purchase state-owned housing at discount rates; and 5) Establish housing committees.
The HPF was adopted as the core component of the overall housing reform in 2) Financial support to increase housing production and to meet the housing need of those families in poor living conditions; and
3) The establishment of a housing system under which the State, work units and individuals would join together to provide finance for housing development.
Shanghai was the first Chinese city to implement the HPF Scheme as a financial tool for housing reform that included a form of compulsory saving by employees
All employers and employees in Shanghai were required to contribute a percentage of the employees' salaries on a monthly basis to the "employees' account" in the HPF. Initially the percentage was set at 5% and subsequently increased to 7% in 1999. The savings under this Scheme were deposited in banks designated by the Shanghai Housing Provident Management Centre and the use of the fund was restricted to provide loans to enterprises for housing production; provision of loans directly to workers to purchase their own flats from the private housing market; and the provision of finance to enterprises or individual households for major housing repair works.
Since its implementation in 1991, the HPF Scheme has generally been regarded as successful in Shanghai, and it has provided a role model for other ci- Table 2 ).
The increasing housing crisis and financial shortages in the late 1970s made the government re-think the over-centralized financial system which excluded market forces and the initiative of individuals and work units in the finance process. The restructuring of the housing finance system entails the development of financial institutions to lessen the government's control over housing finance, to widen the financial sources and to produce an adequate and stable flow of funds to the housing sector. And housing providence finance numerated these three components in the operation of the HPF: 1) Housing Committee The body responsible for the planning of residential housing in the city/ province.
2) Provident Fund Management Centre The body responsible for the operation and management of the Fund. Responsibilities vary under different approaches.
3) Designated Banks
Funds are deposited in a bank selected by the Provident Fund Management Committee had the ultimate mandate for deciding substances related to scheme.
On the other hand, the banks were responsible for handling the deposits, lending and auditing as well as financial management. Every employee under the scheme had a specific deposit account with a designated bank. This approach was adopted in Shanghai and its neighboring cities such as Nanjing capital of Jiangsu Province.
In the second approach, the Administration Centre accumulates funds and renders management and financial supervision over applications of the fund, including the storage and retrieval of individual records. The Management Centres also had the responsibility to ensuring application applied for specified purposes.
Hence banks were only custodian for issuing loans to employees. Replication been adopted in Smaller cities such Wenzhou and Guilin. Viewing that the first In some cities, the Management Centre formed an integral part of the Housing Authority, which was often ambiguous in matters concerning decisions [6] . Unfortunately, there was no evidence to determine which approach should be adopted, however most local governments had selected the first approach to implement their HPF Schemes. In an attempt to facilitate and standardise the administration, the State Council Housing Reform Leading Group (as well as owner occupancy, and it called for housing finance reform suggested that loc al governments [7] should adopt computer network systems and fund card network systems in managing the provident funds.
The Role of the HPF in Housing Supply
Diminishing role of the state in direct housing production Before housing reform, work units and government were responsible for the production of new housing units and the maintenance of the existing housing stock for all employees. Housing units in the form of staff dwellings represented the largest component of the housing stock in Shanghai and this had imposed an extremely heavy financial burden on local governments. In the initial stage of urban housing reform, the focus was on increasing housing production by means of sharing the financial burden among the government, the work units and the individuals such as in the Comfortable Housing Program. The policy of allocation of staff dwellings continued to be implement during the 1990s and most of the funds, either from the State or generated by the work units themselves were directly used for new housing production. New housing units were subsequently converted into staff dwellings and either allocated or sold to eligible workers. run homes received funding from the government for buildings and fittings, as well as some staff costs [8] . It was apparent that although the role of the State in housing production had been diminishing, the work units continued to play a very significant role as the middle man between the producers of housing and the end users. Therefore, the concept of housing provision by staff dwellings had remained unchanged despite the introduction the urban housing policy reform 
Increasing Role of Self-Raised Fund in Housing Finance
In Shanghai, investment in residential housing remained as a significant component of the city's total fixed asset investment. Since 1995 the total floor space of residential housing completed each year was more than 10 million·m (Table   3 ).
Fund for the continuous high level of housing production was largely due to the continuous growth of domestic loans and fund-raising activities (Table 4) .
With the introduction of the urban housing reform, work units could no longer rely on the government for funding to construct quarters for their employees and therefore they were required to seek for alternative sources of finance. The
Shanghai City Government initiated idea of HPF to ensure that a certain portion of the city's revenue was channelled to become capital for new housing production and the maintenance of existing housing stock. In practice, the HPF played a very significant role in financing affordable housing production in Shanghai.
According to Zhang's study, By the end of 1966, HPF raised RMB 11.4 billion in Shanghai and provided RMB 8.4 billion in loans to work units for housing construction and RMB 2 billion in mortgage loans to 46,000 households for 
The Role of the Fund Scheme in Housing Demand
After years of housing reform, the Chinese Government considered promoting home ownership by individual families as a long-term strategy, which could revitalise the local real estate sector and fostered economic growth in the long term. Initially, the strategy adopted by the Chinese Government in housing reform was mainly concentrated on the production side aimed at producing According to the Mortgage Units Director of the HPF Centre, applications for mortgages from the Centre have become increasingly popular. From January to May 1999, the Centre provided loans amounting to RMB 2.45 billion; however, receipts contributed only RMB1.31 billion. In July 1999, the Shanghai Housing
Reform Fund was established to provide welfare housing maintenance using funding generated from the sale of state-owned housing, thus bringing in an additional RMB 2 billion of income to the HPF. The Director also stated that the
Centre could obtain loans from commercial banks to raise extra funds because of the pressing need for low-interest mortgages.
Limitations of the Provident Fund
Evidence collected indicates that the HPF Scheme is a feasible and appropriate measure for long-term affordable housing development in urban areas in China.
It can generate effective demand as well as providing funding for housing production. Shanghai's experience in dealing with housing provision by means of the HPF Scheme can be taken as a good example for other major cities in China to follow. However, there are some limitations associated with the Scheme as stated in the following section.
Gap between Regions and Enterprises
There are large gaps between wealthy and underdeveloped regions and also between wealthy and poor enterprises. The success of the HPF Scheme depends upon contributions from employers and employees. There are many instances where old inefficient state enterprises are unable to pay salaries for months and have no ability to make contributions to their employees' HPF. Shanghai is a leading commercial and industrial city and it enjoys some of the highest household incomes in China. The success of Housing Provident Scheme does not necessarily mean it will succeed in all other Chinese cities, especially those in the less developed regions where local GDP per capita is low.
Financial Burden to Enterprises
The implementation of the HPF inevitably imposed a financial burden on enterprises as they are required to subscribe an equal amount contribution to the HPF as their employees. This might not be a major problem at the early stage of the HPF Scheme since enterprises obtain significant income by selling off existing housing units to employees. Most enterprises utilised funds from selling their flats to pay for loans under HPF. Inevitably this source of funding will diminish in time and will eventually be exhausted when all the housing units are sold. On the other hand, enterprises were put under pressure to raise the employees'
wages under the new policy of wage reform to cash state welfare into wages.
Wages in cash term will therefore continue to increase and likewise the enterprises' burden on the contribution to HPF will also increase. Hence it may be World Journal of Engineering and Technology difficult for some enterprises to meet the demands of these two requirements simultaneously.
Increasing Number of Unemployed Workers
HPF mainly targets employees in urban areas in China. Those who are unemployed or laid-off are excluded from the Scheme. In the process of privatization and economic reform, it is expected that the number of laid-off workers will increase. Under the current situation, the unemployed workers will face a severe housing problem. They will no longer be allocated housing by work units as in the past and they have no HPF either. Thus the purchase of housing is outside the capacity of these social groups.
Problem of Inequality
The operational challenges of rural financial intermediation are compounded by state development involvement of NGOs in running microfinance institutions.
The HPF Scheme was operated on the basis of low interest rates both for deposit and loan. As a result, those who did not use the Scheme suffered from a loss in interest gained from their deposit in the Fund. In reality, it was always the better-off families who had enough savings to pay the down payment and therefore enjoyed the benefit of the low interest rate from the Fund. Those low income and poor families who were unable to purchase their homes but were required to contribute to the fund were in practice subsidizing the better-off families. As pointed out by Wang, The Provident Fund appears to be good idea to help the low-income families to save for housing. However, its impact is also limited to the better-off urban residents employed by the state sector, particularly the administrative and institutional organizations.
These organizations are sup-ported by government fund through the budge [11] .
Mismanagement and illegal utilisation of the fund The HPF was managed by the HPF Management Centres at the city level. However, the role of the Management Centres was unclear since they were operating more like a government body rather than an independent financial entity; hence they might not bear any legal liability if the HPF Scheme accumulated debt. Furthermore, the relationship between the designated banks and the Management Centres was also confused. While there are rules governing the use , the control of the actual use of the Fund at the operational level was rather losing. There were cases that HPF was not under proper management. Some local government were found to use the HPF for other non-housing projects. For instance. A report indicated by local government illegally used more than RMB 200 million of HPF to concept the airport as well as government offices and a commercial building.
Undeveloped Banking System
The amount of loan an individual could obtain from the HPF is in proportion to 
Conclusions
The outcome of this study supports Jiangsu province research Grant of the Southeast University under grant meet housing needs by developing a private housing market is accurate despite the identification of associated problems. the fundamentals of a sound and effective private housing market is having access to adequate finances, for both developers and home buyers [12] . In the last decade, This study has provided an account of the financing strategy adopted by the Shanghai government to tackle the provision of housing and related issues pertaining habitation and housing for the general public by means of the HPF Scheme. The Scheme has been successfully implemented by concerned parties.
HPF together with the funding allocated from the State under the National Comfortable Housing Project has successfully increased housing production and has provided to workers with housing need. With the total abolition of housing allocation by 1999, HPF subsidized by stimulating housing claim by loaning workers with housing loans at low interest rates for the purpose of affordability.
HPF however not able to help those state-owned enterprises with financial difficulties since they were not even able to pay the workers' wages, let alone contribute to the Scheme. Additionally, jobless workers excluded from HPF hence could not receive benefit. With further improvement of state-owned initiatives, it is predictable that the number of jobless workers in China will rise.
therefore, significant of China considers the development of a comprehensive supported rental housing program, similar to the public rental housing program in Hong Kong, to provide basic housing for these families.
Moreover, the success of the HPF deepens on the overall development of the banking system in China [14] . Since the objective of the paper is the review the role of the HPF in financing affordable housing development in China, issues concerning the reform of the banking system in China, which is extensive in nature, will be dealt with separately by a future paper.
To conclude, although the short falls associated with the Scheme, yet an effective housing finance model seriously considered and adopted by other major cities in China that might face similar housing problems in the coming years.
Further study is needed to closely examine these problems in order to make HPF a more effective means of financing affordable housing development in China.
